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EARMARKED CHARITABLE
CONTRIBUTIONS: IN SEARCH OF A
STANDARD
Brinley v. Commissioner'
The charitable contribution deduction has been a part of the federal in-
come tax since 1917.2 Yet, there is no agreement among the circuits on the
criteria by which to test whether a payment should qualify as a charitable
contribution.3 The confusion in this area was brought to a head when, in two
1984 cases recognized by the courts as involving virtually identical facts, Brin-
ley v. Commissioner4 and White v. United States,5 the courts not only reached
different results, but analyzed the case differently.
A contribution is deductible only if it is either "to" or "for the use of" an
organization qualified under Internal Revenue Code section 170(c)(2)(B) to
receive charitable gifts. The Internal Revenue Code, by requiring the contri-
bution to be to an "organizational donee," distinguishes between public char-
ity which is deductible, and private charity which is not deductible. The dis-
tinction between public and private charity produces close cases when a
contribution, although providing a benefit to the charitable organization, has
been "earmarked" by the donor for a particular use.6
The "to" or "for the use of" language of I.R.C. section 170 includes con-
tributions in the form of services performed for a charitable organization by
allowing a deduction for unreimbursed expenses incurred while performing
those services.7 Thus, a deduction is allowed for the expenses of meals and
lodging, otherwise non-deductible living expenses, when a taxpayer is away
1. 52 T.C.M. (P-H) 1665 (1983), affid on rehearing, 82 T.C. 932 (1984). In
order to avoid confusion of the two Brinley opinions, the Tax Court's first opinion will
be referred to as "Brinley r' and the reconsideration will be referred to as "Brinley II."
2. Revenue Act of 1917, § 1201(2), ch. 63, 40 Stat. 300, 330.
3. See, e.g., Stubbs v. United States, 428 F.2d 885 (9th Cir. 1970), cert. de-
nied, 400 U.S. 1009 (1971) (intent the sole test to determine whether a charitable
contribution); Crosby Valve & Gauge Co. v. Comm'r, 380 F.2d 146 (1st Cir. 1967),
cert. denied, 389 U.S. 976 (1967) (intent irrelevant in determining whether a payment
is a charitable contribution); see also Colliton, The Meaning of "Contribution or Gift"
for Charitable Contribution Deduction Purposes, 41 OHIO ST. L.J. 973, 973-74 (1980)
("the courts have adopted three apparently inconsistent analyses to decide whether a
deduction is allowable").
4. Brinley II, 82 T.C. 932.
5. 725 F.2d 1269 (10th Cir. 1984), rev'g 514 F. Supp. 1057 (D. Utah 1981).
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from home and performing charitable services.8
Brinley and White, which involve both an earmarked contribution and
deduction of living expenses, provide a unique opportunity for reconsideration
of the standards used to determine the deductibility of charitable contribu-
tions. This Note suggests a new test to determine whether a payment should
qualify as a charitable deduction, and suggests that Brinley and White can be
reconciled.
The facts in the two cases cases are virtually indistinguishable., In both,
parents sought a charitable deduction for money they paid directly to a child
for expenses while serving away from home as a full-time missionary for the
Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints (LDS Church).10
The prospective missionary is called by the Church to two years of volun-
tary service in the mission field."" Upon acceptance of the call to mission work,
the missionary begins service as an ordained minister of the LDS Church.1 2
The missionary first goes through a training program conducted by the
Church at Provo, Utah. After completing the training program, the missionary
begins work at the designated mission site.13
The Church determines the minimum amount required for the mission-
ary's living expenses. The Church's policy is to ask the missionary's parents to
contribute the amount needed for living expenses directly to the missionary on
a monthly basis.14 In these cases, the contributions in fact supported the mis-
8. See Treas. Reg. § 1.262-1(b)(5), T.D. 7207, 1972-2 C.B. 106, 159-60.
9. Brinley 11, 82 T.C. at 936; see also White, 725 F.2d at 1270 (stating that
most of the 25,000 LDS missionaries are supported the same way as the missionary in
that case).
10. Brinley II, 82 T.C. at 932; White, 725 F.2d at 1270.
11. White, 514 F. Supp. at 1058. A call to a mission originates from the deter-
mination by local LDS officials (called bishops or branch presidents) that a member of
their congregation has demonstrated "adherence to the faith and doctrines of the reli-
gion by observing its standards and commandments." Appellant's Brief on Appeal at 4,
Brinley II,
12. White, 514 F. Supp. at 1058. Following ordination, the missionary is given
the religious title of "Elder." Appellant's Brief on Appeal at 5, Brinley I. The author-
ity of an Elder in the LDS Church is as follows:
Elders: Elders have authority to preside over meetings and conduct them
as prompted by the Holy Ghost. They also have authority to teach and ex-
pound the scriptures; to watch over the church; to baptize; lay on hands for
the bestowal of the Holy Ghost; confirm those baptized, members of the
church; administer the sacrament, and ordain other elders and also priests,
teachers, and deacons.
Id. (citing 1 B. ROBERTS, A COMPREHENSIvE HISTORY OF THE CHURCH OF JESUS
CHRIST OF LATTER-DAY SAINTS 193-94 (Century 1) (1930)).
13. White, 514 F. Supp. at 1058.
14. White, 725 F.2d at 1270. In Brinley II, the claimed deduction of $942 re-
lated to their missionary son's expenses for the period October 15, 1977 to December
31, 1977.
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sionary while in the mission field and also paid a portion of the cost of the
travel to the mission site. In each case, the parents then claimed a charitable
contribution deduction for money paid to support their missionary son.
1 5
In Brinley I, the parents claimed their contribution was to the LDS
Church whether the money was paid directly to the church or to their mission-
ary son.1 6 The Brinleys argued that because the contribution was "to the
church" it should be deductible under I.R.C. section 170.17 The Commissioner
argued that the deduction should not be allowed because the church never had
control of the funds and the Brinley's might have been motivated by a desire
to benefit their son rather than the charity. 8 The Tax Court held that to qual-
ify as a charitable contribution, the funds must be contributed to a qualified
organization as required by I.R.C. section 170(c). The court also required the
contribution to be absolute. This requirement does not allow the donor to
"earmark" a designated individual to receive the contribution. The court
found that these requirements were not met because the funds were contrib-
uted directly to the Brinleys' son.19
On substantially identical facts, the District Court of Utah in White2"
denied the taxpayers' deduction.21 The White court used the two requirements
Room and Board during training 50
Room and Board in Michigan 500
(approx. $200 per mo.)
Religious Literature 72
Incidentals 50
Car rental required by mission 93
Mileage to/from airport for departure to Michigan 7
TOTAL $942
Appellant's Brief on Appeal at 7, Brinley I.
15. Brinley II, 82 T.C. at 934.
16. Brinley 1, 52 T.C.M. (P-H) at 1668.
17. I.R.C. § 170 (1985) provides, in part:
(a) Allowance of deduction -
(1) GENERAL RULE. - There shall be allowed as a deduction any chari-
table contribution (as defined in subsection (c)) payment of which is made
within the taxable year. A charitable contribution shall be allowable as a de-
duction only if verified under regulations prescribed by the Secretary. ...
(c) Charitable contribution defined.-For purposes of this section, the
term "charitable contribution" means a contribution or gift to or for the use
of - ...
(2) A corporation, trust, or community chest, fund, or foundation -.
(B) organized and operated exclusively for religious, charitable, scien-
tific, literary, or educational purposes. ...
18. Brinley 1, 52 T.C.M. (P-H) at 1668.
19. Id. at 1669.
20. 514 F. Supp. at 1058. The taxpayer when served with a deficiency notice
may choose to pay the deficiency and sue for a refund in federal district court, or
ignore the deficiency notice and defend in the Tax Court. The Whites chose the former
route.
21. Id. at 1061. The taxpayers' argument, that the contribution met the "to or
for the use of" requirement of § 170, was essentially the same one made by the taxpay-
920 [Vol. 50
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identified by the Tax Court in Brinley I to measure the deductibility of the
contribution. 22 The court found that the contribution failed to meet either re-
quirement. The first requirement was not satisfied because the missionary was
not a qualified recipient. Because the contributed funds were earmarked for
the taxpayer's son and he, rather than the church, had discretion as to how
they were spent, the requisite organizational control over the gift was found
lacking.23
The district court's decision in White was reversed by the Tenth Circuit
Court of Appeals.2' The taxpayers again argued that the contribution was
"to" or "for the use of" the LDS Church. The contribution was characterized
as one of services and the deduction was claimed for incidental expenses in-
curred in the rendition of those services. 25 The government argued that the
Church must have control of the contribution for it to be deductible. The
Tenth Circuit agreed with the taxpayer's characterization of the transaction
and found that control by the organization had never been required for deduc-
tion of expenses incident to the rendition of charitable services.26
Following the decision in White, which was favorable to their position, the
Brinleys were granted reconsideration by the Tax Court. Because White arose
in another circuit, the Tax Court was not bound by that decision.2 7 The
Brinleys requested a deduction for the payment of costs incident to their son's
rendition of services to the LDS Church.28 The Commissioner argued that
characterization of the deduction as one of expenses incident to the donation
of services was improper in this case because the Brinleys contributed no ser-
ers in Brinley L Id. at 1059.
22. Id. at 1058.
23. Id. at 1061.
24. White v. United States, 725 F.2d 1269, rev'g 514 F. Supp. 1057.
25. Id. at 1270-71.
26. Id. at 1271.
27. Brinley II, 82 T.C. at 936. The Tax Court is required to follow decisions of
the court of appeals in the circuit where appeal of the case under consideration would
lie. Golsen v. Comm'r, 54 T.C. 742, 757 (1970).
28. Brinley II, 82 T.C. at 934-35. The Brinleys' argument, adopting the Tenth
Circuit's characterization, was that the transaction should be governed by Treas. Reg.
§ 1.170-1(g), T.D. 7207, 1972-2 C.B. 106, 118, which provides:
Contributions of services. No deduction is allowable under section 170
for a contribution of services. However, unreimbursed expenditures made inci-
dent to the rendition of services to an organization contributions to which are
deductible may constitute a deductible contribution. For example, the cost of
a uniform without general utility which is required to be worn in performing
donated services is deductible. Similarly, out-of-pocket transportation ex-
penses necessarily incurred in performing donated services are deductible.
Reasonable expenditures for meals and lodging necessarily incurred while
away from home in the course of performing donated services also are deduct-
ible. For the purposes of this paragraph, the phrase "while away from home"
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vices to the LDS Church themselves. 9 According to the Commissioner, it was
necessary for the charitable organization to control the funds in order to pre-
vent taxpayers from "channel[ing] funds to their son for the son's personal use
ostensibly as a charitable contribution.130 The Tax Court held for the Com-
missioner that classification of Brinley's payment as one of expenses incident
to charitable services was improper.$'
The Tax Court in Brinley II recognized that if parents had performed the
services themselves the deduction would have been allowed because the ex-
penses would have been incurred incident to the donation of services.3 2 In ad-
dition, the court recognized that if the funds were contributed to the church,
which in turn used them to support the contributor's son, the deduction would
be allowed.33 Therefore, the deductibility of the contribution depended on the
contribution being to a qualified organization. As they had ruled previously in
Brinley I, the Tax Court found that this requirement had not been met.34
The White court, in allowing the deduction, relied entirely on the un-
reimbursed expenditures analysis.3 5 The test used to determine the deductibil-
ity of these expenses is the "primary purpose" test. This test focuses on
"whether the expense provided a substantial, direct, personal benefit to the
taxpayer or to someone other than the charity. '3 6 If the deduction had been
sought by the person performing the services, the missionary son, there is no
question that the deduction would have been allowed.37 The courts differed as
29. Brinley II, 82 T.C. at 934.
30. Id. at 934.
31. Id. at 938.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 940.
34. Id. at 941.
35. The term "unreimbursed expenditures" refers to Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-l(g)
allowance of deduction for expenses incident to the performance of charitable services.
36. Brinley, 82 T.C. at 936. The primary purpose test is used to distinguish
deductible business expenses from non-deductible personal expenses. The test is applied
by analogy to expenses that have both personal and charitable elements.
A deduction may not be allowed for a contribution if the donor receives a signifi-
cant benefit. E.g., Constancio Babilonia, 49 T.C.M. (P-H) 941, 945 (1980) (parents of
Olympic figure skater not allowed to deduct expenses of daughter's skating lessons be-
cause substantial benefit to her personal career was fatal to her claim that her services
were contributed for the benefit of the United States Olympic Committee), afd, 681
F.2d 678 (9th Cir. 1982); David L. Hamilton, 48 T.C.M. (P-H) 737, 740 (1979) (de-
duction not allowed for expenses of transporting Girl Scouts to and from activities be-
cause taxpayer's four children were the principal beneficiaries of the expense). If the
benefit received is merely incidental to the charitable contribution, the personal benefit
to the donor should not be fatal to the deduction. See, e.g., Sherman H. Sampson, 51
T.C.M. (P-H) 1146, 1153 (1982) (taxpayer allowed to deduct expenses of buying in-
formation and drugs in furtherance of state drug enforcement activity, even though
motivated by drug-related deaths of his children, because overriding motivation was to
benefit the community).
37. This is the transaction that Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-1(g) was designed to
cover. See Brinley II, 82 T.C. at 938; White, 725 F.2d at 1271.
[Vol. 50
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to whether the "unreimbursed expenses" analysis applied when the parents
bore the expense and requested the deduction for the son's charitable services.
According to the court in White, expenditures on behalf of a dependent
child should be governed by the same test applicable to expenses incurred by
the parents if they had performed the services.38 In reaching this conclusion,
the court appears to have inferred from the language of I.R.C. section 262
that the family was the proper tax-paying unit."
The Tax Court in Brinley II criticized the White court's conclusion that
the "primary purpose" test applied when the parent's were requesting a deduc-
tion for expenses incurred by their son." According to the Brinley II court, the
"plain meaning" of Treasury Regulation 1.170A-l(g) does not support the
White court's implication that the parents and son could be treated as mem-
bers of a single tax-paying unit. The Tax Court cited I.R.C. section
7701(a)(14) and Treasury Regulation 1.6012-1(a)(4) as making it "clear that,
regardless of age, individual family members are separate taxpayers."4
Neither the Brinley II nor the White court satisfactorily resolved the issue
of whether the individual or the family is the proper unit for taxation. 42 The
38. White, 725 F.2d at 1272.
39. I.R.C. § 262 provides that: "Except as otherwise expressly provided in this
chapter, no deduction shall be allowed for personal, living, or family expenses." How-
ever, Treas. Reg. § 1.262-1 (b)(5) provides an exception to the rule of non-deductibility
for expenses which are deductible under Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-l(g) (which allows for
deduction of unreimbursed expenses while performing charitable services). The court's
reasoning apparently is that, because "personal" and "family" expenses are not distin-
guished in the Code and Regulations, if family expenses are not deductible, neither are
the living expenses of the taxpayer who performs the charitable services personally. 725
F.2d at 1271.
40. Brinley II, 82 T.C. at 937. The court also criticized the holding in White,
arguing that it would allow the parents and son both to claim a deduction for the same
expense in certain circumstances. Id. at 939. This criticism is not justified because the
son's basis for claiming the deduction, that he has incurred unreimbursed expenses, is
lost when he is reimbursed by his parents.
41. Id. at 938. The authority cited by the court does not provide the clarifica-
tion claimed. I.R.C. § 7701(a)(14) defines a "taxpayer" as "any person subject to any
internal revenue tax." Treas. Reg. § 1.6012-1(a)(4) states that a minor is subject to the
same requirements for filing a return as any other individual. Therefore, a minor is not
subject to tax unless he or she has gross income of at least $1,750 from personal service
or funds held in trust for them. It is interesting to note that neither Brinley decision
mentions the son's age or status (whether claimed by his parents as a dependent).
42. This does not appear to be answered clearly in either the code or regula-
tions. The trend appears to be toward viewing the family as the proper unit of taxation.
See D. Bradford & U.S. Treasury Staff, Blueprints for Basic Tax Reform 92-94 (2d.
ed., rev. 1984) (recommending "the family as the primary tax unit" in the model tax).
See generally Bittker, Federal Income Taxation and the Family, 27 STAN. L. REV.
1389 (1975) (recommending that the family be chosen as the unit of taxation).
This trend can also be seen from the history of the income tax in the United
States. Under the 1913 tax, every individual was required to file a tax return. However,
tax reforms in 1948, following the decision in Poe v. Seaborn, 282 U.S. 101 (1930),
allowed for optional joint filing by a husband and wife. The evolution of the tax treat-
6
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result reached in White, that the family is the proper tax unit, at least in the
LDS missionary cases, is probably correct. 3
The LDS missionary cases could also be decided in favor of the taxpayer
if the contribution was held either "to" or "for the use of" the LDS Church. 44
The court in Brinley 11 applied the "contributions analysis" because they held
that Treasury Regulation 1.170A-l(g) was not applicable when the parents
were seeking a deduction for payment of the missionary son's expenses. Under
that test, the deductibility of the contribution is determined by asking: what
was the donor's intent in making the contribution? The court treated the ques-
tion whether the donor made the contribution with the requisite intent to bene-
fit the charity as equivalent to the question whether the LDS Church was
given control over the contributed funds.4 5 Since the funds were paid directly
to the missionary son, the court found that the LDS Church did not have
direct control over the funds.46 The Brinleys argued that their son was an
agent of the LDS Church. The Tax Court rejected their argument because the
funds were received by the son without being handled by a church official.4
7
In reaching this conclusion, the court distinguished Winn v. Commis-
ment of the family is discussed in Bittker, supra, at 1399-1416.
The logical next step would be to treat dependent children as a part of that unit.
Congress, in I.R.C. § 73 (requiring amounts received and expended with respect to the
services of a child to be included in the child's tax computation), has provided a statu-
tory rule in this area. However, as a matter of tax policy, should this rule should be
changed for dependent children? More specifically, as in the Mormon missionary situa-
tion, where § 73 does not apply because the child has no income (because the support
received is a non-taxable gift under I.R.C. § 102), must the deductible expenses of the
child be treated as incurred by a separate taxpayer? This narrower question arises in a
number of situations (e.g., a student supported by gifts from his parents pays interest
on student loans, or personal property tax on her automobile) with the result that the
amounts are not deductible by the parent under the specific language of I.R.C. §§ 163-
164 because the expenses are not the legal liability of the parent. Cf. I.R.C. §
164(b)(5). But a contribution or gift is no one's legal liability. Therefore, in the chari-
table contribution context, the question of what is the taxpaying unit is unavoidable.
43. In the LDS missionary cases, the missionary probably does not have enough
income to require him to file a separate return. See Treas. Reg. § 1.6012-
l(a)(2)(iii)(a). Reimbursement for expenses, received by the missionary from either
the parents or the LDS Church, does not constitute income to the missionary. Rev.
Rul. 62-113, 1962-2 C.B. 10.
If the missionary is considered a separate taxpayer and does not file a return, the
deduction would be lost. However, where the missionary's expenses are borne by a
separate tax-paying entity, in this case the family, that entity should get the benefit of
the deduction. See Rockefeller v. Comm'r, 676 F.2d 35 (2d Cir. 1982) (where taxpayer
allowed a deduction, for salaries of employees whose services were provided to charity).
The argument for allowing the deduction is strongest where, as in White, the mission-
ary son is a dependent. See White, 725 F.2d at 1271.
44. Brinley II, 82 T.C. at 933.
45. Id. at 937.
46. Id. at 938-39.
47. Id. at 940-41.
[Vol. 50
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sioner4 8 In Winn, the taxpayers made a $10,000 contribution in support of
Presbyterian mission work in Korea and the funds were actually so used. Their
contribution was in the form of a check payable to the "Sara Barry Fund."4
The taxpayers restricted their contribution this way to avoid having part of
their contribution go to the World Council of Churches, a cause they did not
support, as it might if contributed as an unrestricted gift to the church. The
court held that the contribution was deductible.5 0 In so holding, the Fifth Cir-
cuit found that the following three factors were sufficient to establish that the
contribution was "for the use of" the church and therefore deductible: 1) the
charitable organization solicited the contribution; 2) the funds were received
by an official of the organization; and 3) the officer handled the funds accord-
ing to the organization's wishes.5 In Brinley II, the court found that a church
official had not received the funds.5 2 The failure to satisfy this requirement,
reasoned the court, prevented the LDS Church from being able to control the
contribution through its officer.5 3
In Brinley II, the Tax Court's insistence on the purely formal presence of
a church official in determining the deductibility of the contribution is troub-
ling. The Tax Court, by insisting on literal compliance with the elements of
the "Winn test," failed to take into account the substantial control exercised
by the LDS Church over the missionaries. Therefore, it is likely that the Fifth
Circuit will reverse the Tax Court's decision in Brinley HI." The district court
48. 595 F.2d 1060 (5th Cir. 1979), rev'g on this point 67 T.C. 499 (1976).
49. Winn, 595 F.2d at 1065. The local Presbyterian church sponsored "Sara
Barry Days" to solicit funds from members for Sara Barry's mission work in Korea.
All contributions received during the "Days" were deposited into Sara's personal ac-
count by Sara's father, an elder at the church. Sara Barry was the Winns' first cousin.
Id.
50. Id.
51. Id. The Tax Court, however, had found that these facts did not show the
donation was ever under the general control of the Presbyterian Church. Therefore, the
Tax Court had disallowed the deduction because, even though they were convinced the
taxpayer intended the funds to be used by Sara Barry in her missionary work, the
contribution was not "to or for the use of" a qualified organization as required by
I.R.C. § 170. Winn, 67 T.C. at 511.
52. Brinley II, 82 T.C. at 941. But see White, 725 F.2d at 1270 (stating that
the missionary is an ordained minister of the church).
53. Brinley 11, 82 T.C. at 941. The court's conclusion that the organization's
ability to control the donation through the officer was critical to the holding in Winn
ignores the facts of that case. In Winn, the taxpayer used the church elder's control
over his contribution to accomplish his object-keeping the World Council of Churches
from receiving any part of his contribution. Winn, 595 F.2d at 1065.
54. The taxpayers in Brinley I filed an appeal in the Fifth Circuit Court of
Appeals on October 25, 1984.
The court of appeals could allow the deduction by applying their own "Winn test."
See supra text accompanying note 51 for the elements of that test. In White, which is
factually indistinguishable, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals found that: 1) the LDS
Church asked the missionary's parents to contribute the amount determined to be the
minimum necessary amount required for living expenses; 2) the missionary is an or-
dained minister of the Church; and 3) the LDS Church exercises almost complete con-
1985]
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in White set out the traditional control standard for measuring the deductibil-
ity of a contribution. The gift must be made to a qualified recipient and the
recipient must control the gift.55 I.R.C. section 170 requires that the contribu-
tion be to a qualified recipient. Control by the recipient is required to insure
that the gift has the "quality of indefiniteness" which separates public from
private generosity.56 To meet the requirements of section 170, the taxpayer
must show that the funds were contributed "to or for the use of" a qualified
recipient, in this case the LDS Church.57 However, because the contribution is
not made directly to the Church, the parents are left with the argument that
the funds were "for the benefit of" the Church by furthering it's missionary
work. In White, the district court acknowledged that the LDS Church ob-
tained a benefit from the contribution, but would not allow the deduction be-
cause the specific use of the funds was controlled by the missionary, not by the
LDS Church. 58
The district court in White suggested that if the funds had been contrib-
uted by the parents to the LDS Church and then given to the missionary son,
the contribution would have been deductible.59 However, this statement is at
best broad, and is probably incorrect because it implies that the insertion of
the LDS Church as a "straw man" would change the result.
If the parents made the contribution to the LDS Church without specify-
ing the beneficiary, the contribution would be deductible. That result recog-
nizes that discretion over the use of the gift by the charitable organization is
the essence of the control requirement.6 0 If instead, the donation is made to
trol over the missionary's activities. White, 725 F.2d at 1270.
55. White, 514 F. Supp. at 1058.
56. White, 514 F. Supp. at 1061. The "quality of indefiniteness" leaves the
choice of where to use the funds with the charity. Id. Indefiniteness is the opposite of
earmarking.
57. Id. at 1059. See IRS PUBLICATION No. 78, CUMULATIVE LIST OF ORGANI-
ZATIONS (1977) (listing the LDS Church as a qualified recipient of charitable gifts).
58. White, 514 F. Supp. at 1059; see also Murray F. Davenport, 44 T.C.M. (P-
H) 1546, 1548 (1975) (taxpayer not allowed a deduction for expenses of an apartment
rented for and used by charitable organization because payment directly to the land-
lord denied the organization the option of either choosing another apartment or putting
the funds to another use entirely).
The taxpayers made the additional argument that the missionary was an author-
ized agent of the LDS Church, and therefore was a qualified recipient of the donation.
The court, however, used the lack of control by the church to dispose of this argument
as well. White, 514 F. Supp. at 1060-61. But see Morey v. Riddell, 205 F. Supp. 918
(S.D. Cal. 1962) (deduction allowed for contributions, in the form of checks payable to
church's ministers and used in part to pay their living expenses, because donors in-
tended to give funds to ministers as agents of the church).
59. White, 514 F. Supp. at 1059.
60. E.g., Rev. Rul. 62-113, 1962-2 C.B. 10 (unless "distinctly marked" so that
they can only be used by him, receipt by missionary son of funds from pool of funds to
which parent had contributed not enough to make contribution non-deductible); cf.
Peace v. Comm'r, 43 T.C. 1, 7-8 (1964) (contributions to missionary pool specified for
benefit of certain missionaries held deductible because in correspondence with donor
[Vol. 50
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the Church but earmarked by the donor for the benefit of a specified individ-
ual, application of the "control requirement" precludes deduction."1 Therefore,
whether a gift to a charitable organization which will foreseeably benefit iden-
tifiable individuals is deductible turns on a finding of control over the contribu-
tion by the organization.
However, it is not clear how much control is required. One argument is
that the language of Treasury Regulation 1.170A-l(g) does not make it clear
that there is a requirement of control by the organizational donee.62 At the
other extreme, the use of a strict requirement of control has produced ques-
tionable results. 63 In cases that have arisen in the context of gifts to church
missionaries, control seems to be found by compliance with the church's con-
tribution procedure." If compliance with the LDS Church's donation program
the organization expressed an intention to determine finally how the funds were
distributed).
61. See Brinley II, 82 T.C. 932; Rev. Rul. 62-113, 1962-2 C.B. at 11 (contribu-
tion to church fund "earmarked for particular individual" treated as gift to that indi-
vidual and not deductible); cf. Thomason v. Comm'r, 2 T.C. 441, 443 (1943) (taxpayer
not allowed to deduct payments for education and maintenance of child, a ward of
charitable organization after having lived with taxpayer for 12 years, for whom tax-
payer "felt a keen fatherly and personal interest"). But see Winn, 595 F.2d 1065
(where deduction allowed when church elder, the missionary's father, received the con-
tribution and deposited it directly in missionary's personal bank account). Note that in
Winn, the Tax Court found that the missionary's father was "a mere conduit" used to
transfer funds from the church to the missionary's own account. 67 T.C. at 510.
62. See Archbold v. United States, 444 F.2d 1120 (Ct. Cl. 1971), where the
court pointed out that the examples in the regulations (currently § 1.170A-1(g)),
namely, the cost of a uniform and "out of pocket transportation expenses," are ex-
penses over which the donee has no control whatsoever. Id. at 1123. Accord Travis
Smith v. Comm'r, 60 T.C. 988 (1973) (where taxpayer, member of church in Ohio,
allowed deduction of expenses incurred during missionary trip to Newfoundland even
though the church did not initiate, control, or receive a direct benefit from his services).
Use of this argument has been limited to the "unreimbursed expenses" analysis.
63. See, e.g., Winn, 67 T.C. at 510-11 (taxpayer not allowed deduction even
though court felt that the funds were contributed by the taxpayer intending to benefit
Presbyterian missionary).
64. See Morey v. Riddell, 205 F. Supp. at 920-21 (court seemed to ignore the
lack of control where taxpayer's donations were made by checks payable to the
church's ministers, because the church, as part of their theology, objected to operating
as a structured organization); Robert N. Mayo, 40 T.C.M. (P-H) 526 (1971) (tax-
payer not allowed deduction for payment directly to Mennonite missionaries, rather
than through the church's established channels, because the court found that this
course of action was taken to insure that those missionaries would receive more than
the amount allocated by the church). But see Winn, 595 F.2d at 1065 (where taxpayer
allowed deduction though made so as to avoid benefit being available for certain of the
church's beneficiaries). It may be possible to reconcile Winn with the other results be-
cause the church had specified that all donations during that period would go to the
beneficiary that was designated by the donor.
It should also be noted, because many of the organizations that receive charitable
contributions are churches, that there are potential Constitutional problems with the
establishment clause. See U.S. CoNsT. amend. I. This is particularly so when the gov-
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is the standard, the contribution in Brinley should be deductible. 65
The control requirement is important to insure that the donated funds are
used for charitable purposes. 66 This policy would still be protected if the con-
trol requirement was satisfied by a finding that the organization exercised sub-
stantial control over the contribution program. Substantial control could be
established by the organization sanctioning the distribution of donations and
directing the activities of the recipients. Application of this "purposive" stan-
dard, while very similar to the "Winn test," would shift the emphasis away
from the formal requirement that an official of the organization handle the
gift.
If this "purposive control standard" is applied when the parents of the
missionary make the contribution to the LDS Church and the Church reim-
burses the missionary's expenses, the contribution should be deductible. 67 The
deduction should also be allowed in the Brinley I situation, where the pay-
ment is made directly to the missionary, rather than to him through the
Church. This result is required because the substance of the transaction is not
changed merely because the Church does not "lay hands" on the money. 8
ernment is put in a position of telling the church how it must structure its solicitation
of contributions for missionaries. The court's awareness of potential conflict with the
establishment clause may explain the result in Morey v. Riddell, 205 F. Supp. 918
(S.D. Cal. 1962).
65. See White, 725 F.2d at 1270 (parents' payments were made to son at the
request of the LDS Church).
66. White, 514 F. Supp. at 1061; see also Brinley II, 82 T.C. at 941.
Another policy furthered by the control requirement is administrative convenience.
By limiting the number of qualified recipients of charitable contributions, the burden is
on the Internal Revenue Service of insuring that all the contributions are used to bene-
fit public rather than private needs. White, 514 F. Supp. at 1061. This policy has been
attacked because it puts a more difficult burden on the deduction of charitable expenses
than on business expenses. The argument made is, because both charitable contribu-
tions and business expenses allow a deduction for what otherwise would be a non-de-
ductible personal expense, the standard for deductibility should be the same. In the
business expense area the standard is the "primary purpose" test. In areas where there
were perceived abuses, new sections of the tax code have been enacted. See, e.g., I.R.C.
§ 274 (dealing with entertainment and travel expenses). Therefore, difficulties in ad-
ministering charitable contributions should be dealt with by the tax code rather than
by a doctrine such as the control requirement. Newman, The Inequitable Tax Treat-
ment of Expenses Incident to Charitable Service, 47 FORDHAM L. REv. 139, 154
(1978).
67. The controls placed by the LDS Church on donations made to their mis-
sionaries would be sufficient to establish control under this test. See White, 725 F.2d
1270 (the Church 1) Sets and solicits the monthly donation of an amount necessary to
meet the missionary's minimum living expenses and considers any amount above this a
non-deductible gift; and 2) exercises almost total control over the activities of the
missionary).
68. This result is required because the form of the transaction is ignored so that
transactions which are economically the same will produce the same tax liability. See
Old Colony Trust Co. v. Comm'r, 279 U.S. 716, 729 (1929); Knetsch v. United States,
364 U.S. 361, 366 (1960).
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Future cases dealing with charitable contributions should be decided by
combining the "purposive control standard" and the "primary purpose" test.8 9
The Commissioner, by arguing both elements of the proposed test in Brinley I,
has recognized that both elements are at issue in a charitable contribution
case.7 0 Also, a careful reading of the Tenth Circuit's opinion in White implies
that both the control and primary purpose tests were considered.7 1
The suggested test incorporates the reasoning of both the Brinley II and
White courts. It retains the control test, although "watered down" from the
way it was applied by the Tax Court. Thus, the concern that parents could
abuse the charitable contribution deduction, by using it to pay their son's ex-
penses that are personal and not charitable, is addressed. The test also adopts
the "primary purpose" test to insure that the donor's intent in making the
contribution will be considered in determining the deductibility of the gift.
The proposed test makes it clear that the "expenses incident to the rendi-
tion of charitable services" case does not have to be a special situation subject
to a different test as both the White and Brinley II courts suggest.72 The ac-
ceptance by the LDS Church of the services contributed by the missionary son
would satisfy the "purposive control standard." The payment of the mission-
ary's living expenses would be deductible under Treasury Regulation 1.170A-
l(g), which by cross-reference to Treasury Regulation 1.162-1(b)(5) allows
the deduction of living expenses when away from home and incurred incident
to the donation of charitable services. Therefore, but for the Tax Court's insis-
tence on formalistic application of the requirement of control by the organiza-
tional donee, the different approaches of the White and Brinley II courts can
be reconciled.
MICHAEL R. NOBLE
69. This two-part test is suggested by Professor Peter Wiedenbeck.
Wiedenbeck, Charitable Contributions: A Policy Perspective, 50 Mo. L. REv. 85, n. 64
and accompanying text (1985).
70. In Brinley 1, the Commissioner argued both that the LDS did not have
control over the donation, and that the parent's contribution might have been moti-
vated by the desire to benefit their son rather than the Church. 52 T.C.M. (P-H) at
1668.
71. This inference can be drawn from the court's emphasis on facts establishing
substantive control over the contributions, though their decision was based on the un-
reimbursed expenditures analysis which required them to deal only with the primary
purpose test.
72. See White, 725 F.2d at 1271 (a requirement of "control over the expendi-
ture of funds . . . has never been applied to expenses incurred by a taxpayer perform-
ing services for a bona fide charitable organization"); Brinley II, 82 T.C. at 937 (in-
curred by a taxpayer performing services for a bona fide charitable organization");
Brinley II, 82 T.C. at 937 (court will continue to apply different tests depending on
whether unreimbursed expenses or earmarked contribution).
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